Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
SECTION 1: GENERAL
- This chapter deals with the more important aspects of intelligence and
counter-intelligence during ATOPS.
Importance of Intelligence
- During conventional operations the enemy is clearly defined and easily
identifiable. The nature of his Organization and equipment, together with
the relative ease of identification, facilitates the intelligence personnel's'
task of predicting future enemy actions. A major characteristic of ATOPS,
however, is that the terrorist merges with or may be part of a local
population. Enemy action is likely to be characterized by guerrilla tactics
employing equipment requiring virtually no large-scale identifiable
- During ATOPS therefore, a more intensive intelligence effort is demanded
in order to provide commanders with the detailed and timely intelligence
required. Intelligence concerning the local population becomes a prime
requirement. An efficient intelligence system is essential to ensure that
ATOPS are successful and there is no waste of time, manpower or resources.
Importance of Counter-Intelligence
- The value of effective counter-intelligence cannot be overemphasized. To
offset his inferiority in manpower, equipment and resources, the enemy
relies on surprise to achieve success. The degree of surprise he attains is
in direct proportion to the amount of intelligence he is able to collect.
Unless the enemy's intelligence collection is countered, he will be able to
concentrate his limited means with impunity against vulnerable areas and
where reaction by forces will be weakest.
- Effective counter-intelligence during ATOPS is again complicated by the
enemy infiltrating the local population. This can facilitate his collection
efforts and prejudice the counter-intelligence task. Sound cooperation
between all affected forces, services and civil authorities assumes even
Responsibility Of Commanders
- Commanders at all levels are responsible for the coordination and
processing of intelligence required for the planning and conduct of
operations. This responsibility embraces the following:
- The collection of information.
- The collation of information.
- The dissemination of intelligence to all levels.
- Those counter-intelligence measures required to ensure military
security within a commander's sphere of responsibility.
- Commanders must decide whether to react immediately upon
information/intelligence received, or whether to delay reaction until
additional information is obtained. Commanders must ensure that their
actions do not prematurely betray the information they have at their
disposal, as untimely action could compromise the success of future
operations. Successful utilization of intelligence requires experience and a
thorough knowledge of the enemy in the area.
- Coordination. The successful conduct of ATOPS
dictates close cooperation and interaction between security forces, civil
authorities and the local population. It also demands the coordination of
the efforts of the various organizations and agencies contributing to the
overall intelligence effort in the area. Duplication of gaps in the
intelligence effort resulting from poor coordination could neutralize the
effectiveness of the whole intelligence effort. Military forces are unable
to collect all the information they require; on the other hand, they may
acquire information which does not directly concern them. This emphasizes the need for the
centralization and coordination of the entire intelligence
SECTION 2: INTELLIGENCE
Nature of Information
- In ATOPS the collection of information should concentrate on:
- The internal enemy and, if possible, the external support.
- Other important factors such as:
- Climatic and meteorological conditions.
- Internal enemy. It is essential to know:
- a. Military Characteristics.
- 1. Organization and strength.
- 2. Means at his disposal.
- 3. Tactical doctrine and procedure.
- 4. Operational capabilities.
- 5. Combat efficiency and morale.
- 6. Intelligence and liaison systems. The means used, e.g.,
couriers, post office, etc.
- 7. Standard of training.
- Leaders, their personalities, operational effectiveness, normal
hideouts/bases, relatives, friends and lovers.
- Political, psychological and social objectives and activities;
propaganda methods and infiltration into various organizations.
- Economic means and availability of food.
- Physical condition and standard of health.
- Professed or proclaimed ideology.
- Secret organizations.
- Bases which are, or could possibly be, used.
- External support.
- External aid its nature, importance and scope.
- Training bases, their location and strength.
- Procedures and routes used.
- Contact and links with local population (personalities and method of
- Population. A thorough knowledge of the
population, with emphasis on the following points, is necessary:
- Customs and dress.
- Tribes, languages and dialects.
- Religious, social and tribal organizations, including chiefs, advisers
- Political tendencies.
- Causes of discontent and antagonism. Hopes and desires, fears and
- Existing relations with the authorities, and with the enemy.
- Economic resources and limitations.
- Standard of health.
- Terrain. In order to neutralize any initial
advantages the enemy may have resulting from his "perfect
identification with the terrain," it is vital to obtain, as soon as
possible, a thorough knowledge of the terrain. Points which should
receive consideration are:
- Areas most likely to be used as bases which would usually have the
- Difficult access.
- Cover from aerial reconnaissance.
- Locations favoring defense and offering covered withdrawal routes.
- Availability of water.
- Most likely enemy target areas, e.g.. installations.
- Roads, tracks and paths, including those leading out of the area with
special reference to areas bordering on hostile countries.
- Location and capabilities of bridges, ferries and obligatory crossing
- Areas where troop movement will be difficult.
- Location of villages, farms and other settlements.
- Crops, their cycles and the possibility of being advantageously used
by the enemy or by government forces.
- Possible sources of water. Suitable locations for military bases.
- Climatic and environmental conditions. It is of
importance to gather data concerning conditions which may restrict the
mobility of troops or which may enable the enemy to carry out surprise
actions. Information should therefore be collected on the following:
- Rainfall and its possible consequences.
- Temperature variations.
- Occurrence of fog -- normal times and locations.
- Occurrence of thunderstorms, high winds, etc.
- Infected and unhealthy areas, e.g., tsetse, bilharzia, etc.
Sources of Information
- There are numerous sources of information. Some of the more significant
- Population. The enemy will often live among the population, and thus
these people (provided their confidence and trust is won through
adequate and efficient protection) will be one of the best sources of
- Discontented elements. Civil servants, former chiefs or tribesmen
who, for political or personal reasons, appear to be discontented or
disillusioned with the subversive movement.
- Captured personnel, documents and material. These form vital sources
of information. It is therefore essential that the circumstances of the
capture should be recorded. Details of the record should include when,
where, how, and by whom interrogated, as well as the gist of initial or
combat interrogation. These sources of information should be handled as
- Captured personnel. Personnel who surrender, or who are captured,
are one of the most important sources of information in ATOPS, not
only because of the knowledge they have, but also because of the
documents or material they may have in their possession. It is
important that prisoners be retained for the shortest possible time
by the capturing unit before being sent back to undergo more
detailed interrogation. Care should be taken that captured
terrorists are not given an opportunity to communicate with each
- Captured documents. These will not normally provide information
for immediate exploitation by the troops who capture them. They may,
however, be of great value to higher headquarters. Therefore, after
a brief perusal they should be sent, as quickly as possible, to the
next higher headquarters.
- Captured material. Is generally of tactical and technical value,
either of immediate or future interest. It is important to verify
origin and manufacture.
- Maps and aerial photography. These are useful for obtaining knowledge
of the terrain. Air photographs taken at periodic intervals are
particularly useful for the detection of new tracks and changes in
cultivation or settlements.
- Radio transmissions. These constitute another source of information of
considerable value. Sophisticated equipment and well-trained specialists are necessary to exploit this source. in addition, radio intercepts
from hostile neighboring countries may well provide information
regarding terrorist activity.
- Local authorities. These may be a valuable source of information by
virtue of their detailed and intimate knowledge of an area.
- The collection and exploitation of information should be centralized at
the level at which the ATOPS are planned and directed. Commanders at all
levels must vigorously pursue an active policy of collecting information.
Information will not be exclusively obtained by the military forces and
should be acquired from all available collecting agencies. Some of these
- Reconnaissance patrols.
- Special agents.
- Local authorities.
- Observation posts (OP's).
- Reconnaissance patrols. Reconnaissance is an
excellent way of gaining information. The entire area of interest should be
covered by means of land and air patrols. Special emphasis should be given
to roads, tracks, possible areas for base camps, and supply/arms caches.
Patrolling must be undertaken by day and by night and should be intensified
not reduced, during periods of bad weather (rain, fog, etc.). All patrols
should be in radio contact with the local population to gain information.
- Special agents. The employment and control of
special agents is normally a police function. The use of agents by military
forces should be in full and constant cooperation and coordination with the
police. Agents are infiltrated into or obtained from the enemy or from the
population. Information gained from agents should be carefully compared with
that received from other source. It is extremely important that the
activities of specialized agencies be supplemented by units operating in the
field, who would be trained to regard the collection and prompt reporting of
information as one of their prime duties.
- Local authorities. The knowledge which they
possess of the terrain and population should be fully exploited. In addition
they could be tasked with gaining specific information.
- Observation posts (OP's).
- One method of operating clandestinely which has evolved from
operations has been the use of observation posts. During the dry season,
when the operational area is almost entirely burnt out, the use of OP's
is difficult due to the lack of cover. During this period the use of
OP's is reduced while the searching of kraals and isolated thick areas
is increased. To do this effectively, African soldiers should be used to
supplement European units wherever possible. This overcomes the
communication problem when searching villages, questioning locals, and
when doing listening patrols at night. Apart from this, the African
soldier understands the local inhabitants better and is therefore more
likely to pick up any unusual or suspicious actions.
- Because of the extensive use of OP's by military forces (14F), all
locals and terrorists soon become aware of MF using high ground for
OP's. Every effort should therefore be made to remain clandestine and
effective. To achieve this:
- Choose unlikely op Positions (i.e.-, thick cover instead of high
- When occupying OP's, walk in by night.
- Do not debus within 5,000 meters of OP positions to be occupied.
- Take precautions to ensure no tracks are left, i.e., use civilian footwear, wear socks over footwear, don't move over cultivated land
or on well-used paths.
- Do not stay in one OP for too long.
- Use small, lightly equipped groups. Only two men should occupy the
OP while the remainder of the stick is concealed nearby.
- Restrict movement on OP's to a bare minimum.
- Observe something specific, e.g., suspect kraal.
- Where necessary, use two-man OP's in immediate proximity to
- Use night-viewing equipment where possible.
- All listening OP's should have an African element, where possible.
- Maximum advantage must be taken of a unit's detailed knowledge of an area.
To achieve this it will be necessary for a unit to maintain detailed records
of all information it has gained concerning its area. This will ensure
continuity and will provide a valuable source of information when units are
- One of the greatest difficulties that intelligence staff have to contend
with during operations is incomplete and vague, and sometimes inaccurate and
contradictory, reports on incidents or enemy activity. on other occasions
reports are considerably delayed. Therefore, it cannot be too strongly
stressed that the speedy and accurate passage of information from all levels
can be vital to an operation.
SECTION 3: COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
- In the field of counterintelligence, military security is of the greatest
interest and importance to the military forces. The security of the borders,
harbors, airports, travelers and baggage, which also has great importance,
is the responsibility of the police.
- Security is a subject that is not purely the concern of experts, but that
of everyone. The expert will make a specialist contribution to security, but
the success of his work will depend largely upon the efficiency, alertness
and common sense of the average officer and soldier.
- It is not a practicable proposition to station specialists in every place
where classified information is held, where vital equipment or stores are
located, or where people are susceptible to subversion. Great reliance is
therefore placed on the cooperation of individuals who must perfectly
understand the importance of counter-intelligence with respect to security.
- Military security, which is one of the facets of
counter- intelligence, is concerned with the imposition of controls by the
military within the military. These controls take the form of:
- Orders and instructions.
- Physical security means.
- Screening of service, personnel, when necessary.
- Constant vigilance is necessary if security is
to be preserved. The terrorist with his numerous informers will be quick to
exploit any breaches by security forces. Thus the education of all ranks in
the dangers of the indirect attack and in the reasons for security orders
and physical security measures is essential. Certain measures are therefore
necessary to prevent the enemy from gaining information:
- Denial measures. These are measures aimed at
denying the enemy the opportunity of obtaining information. Some
examples of denial measures, and circumstances which may lead to a
breach of security, are:
- Every military person is responsible to his commander for the
safeguarding of information.
- Conversations on classified subjects which may be overheard in
public places, or on the telephone or radio. Some of the worst
examples have taken place in messes and bars within the hearing of
barmen and other unauthorized persons. Individuals often boast of
their position, achievements and knowledge.
- Discussions of operational or classified matters with wives,
relatives and friends are not permitted. All these are unauthorized persons and such matters are not their concern.
- Routine should often be changed, e.g., relief of guards.
- The techniques and procedures in the mounting and execution of
operations should periodically be modified, thus avoiding repetition
which may facilitate the identification of military force
- The number of persons involved in the planning of an operation
should be restricted. The "need to know" and "need to
hold" principles with regard to classified material should be
applied; this applies particularly to operation orders.
- Avoid holding extraordinary conferences/orders which may reveal
that an operation is to be mounted.
- Prior abnormal air and land reconnaissance should be avoided.
- Ensure that personnel participating in an operation do not carry
any personal or official documents besides identification papers.
- Detain all persons encountered in the objective area, or its
immediate vicinity until after the operation.
- Containers of classified documents should never be left unlocked
- Classified documents should not be left unattended, thus
permitting them to be read, stolen or photographed by unauthorized persons.
- Classified documents should be controlled through an efficient
- Classified documents should only be held in places where their
security is guaranteed.
- Classified waste should be safeguarded prior to destruction.
- The access to military establishments and buildings should be
strictly controlled. All persons working within military
installations should be security vetted and issued with
identification cards. A visitors' registry should be maintained.
- Keys to offices in which classified material is held or displayed
should be strictly controlled.
- Security clearance should be obtained for lectures and articles
before their delivery or publication.
- No classified letters should be included in "Daily
Files" which are circulated.
- Deception measures. These are measures
designed to mislead the enemy. Some of the steps which may be taken
during the planning and execution of an operation are:
- Start rumors, giving the enemy false information concerning your
plans, which may justify preparations for the intended operation.
- Information concerning areas of interest should not be restricted
to the area of immediate concern. Simultaneous gathering of
information will help to conceal the real intentions.
- Guides or local trackers should be obtained as late as possible
and should not be restricted to those who come from, or have
knowledge of the objective area.
- Advantage should be taken of the night and unfavorable weather
conditions to mount operations.
- Deployments in false directions should be initiated. These could
coincide with the deployment of the force which is to undertake the
- Openly simulate the unloading of vehicles and secretly continue
with the deployment.
- Carry out reconnaissance in areas other than the area of interest.
- Artillery or air force preparatory fire may be laid down in areas
other than, but in close proximity to, the chosen objectives.
- Press. Because of public desire for news, the
presence or intrusion of the press must be expected. In the interests of
security it is therefore necessary to control their activities. Detailed
below is a guide for handling members of the press:
- Whatever their level, commanders are to adhere to the directives
issued by higher authority.
- Press members should always present their credentials in the execution
of their duty. The purpose of their visit should always be made known by
their higher authority. In all cases press representatives must be
accompanied by a duly qualified officer or non-commissioned officer.
- They should only be granted freedom of action compatible with
- Relations with the press should be cordial without, however, divulging
information on subjects which, for security reasons, should not be
- Unless authorized, press conferences should not be held. Questions
asked should be written down and answers only provided after approval.
- Films and photographs should be strictly controlled. Restricted items
and installations which should not be photographed should be
- Censorship Measures.
- Censorship of correspondence of military personnel will only be
implemented after a government decision.
- Personnel should be constantly reminded that they should not include
details of a classified nature in their personal correspondence.